Deng's speech was political dynamite because it was at odds with the general direction of the economic policies that were adopted after the Tiananmen tragedy of June 4, 1989. As the implosion of the Soviet Union in August 1991 had been widely interpreted within China to be proof that a Soviet-style economic system was incapable of catching up with the private market economies of the West, Deng's speech was a castigation of those political leaders and economic technocrats who continued to favor central allocation of resources and near-total state ownership of capital. Chinese society at large rallied very strongly around Deng's interpretation of the verdict of the CPC in December 1978 and his call for continued marketization and internationalization of the Chinese economy. Deng's mobilization of the popular will allowed the 14th Congress of the CPC held in October 2002 to declare that the CPC's mission was to achieve "socialism with Chinese characteristics" and to finally drop the word "plan" from the official vocabulary in characterizing the ideal economy. China thereby not only returned to the 1979-88 path of convergence to a private market economy, but also accelerated the pace of convergence in a series of fairly abrupt changes.
The bulk of the collectively-owned township-village enterprises (TVEs) in the countryside were privatized under various guises such as their transformation into shareholding cooperatives. 5 Almost all of the small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatized 6 ; and many of the large SOEs and state-owned banks (SOBs) were corporatized and had part of their shares sold in foreign stock markets. The two turning points were 1994 and 1996, see Ho, Bowles and Dong (2003) . 6 SOEs are unincorporated firms that are entirely state-owned. The level of employment at state-owned units (SOEs plus state organs, state institutions and social organizations at the central and local levels) went up from 74.5 million in 1978 to 112.6 million in 1995, and then dropped to 85.7 million in 1999 and to 64.3 million in 2006. The employment at collectively-owned units was 20.5 million, in 1978, 36.3 million in 1991, 17 .1 million in 1999, and 7.6 million in 2006. Source is Table 5 -2 in National Bureau of Statistics (2007) . 7 Although the state shares of output and ownership of productive assets are now lower than in 1978, the state still controls a substantial proportion of economy. In the industrial sector in 2006, while SOEs (unincorporated firms that are entirely state-owned) accounted for only 9.7 of gross output value (GOV) and 16.8 percent of total assets, state-holding companies (corporations where the state is the biggest shareholder) accounted for 21.5 percent and 29.6 percent respectively. This means that state-controlled firms produced at least 31.2 percent of GOV and 46.4 percent of total assets in the industrial sector. Sources are Tables 14-1 and 14-8 in National Bureau of Statistics (2007) .
Committee of the National People's Congress amended the constitution to give private property the same legal status as public property.
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In retrospect, China's accession to WTO is particularly significant development; and the process of WTO accession is particularly revealing about the vision of the top political leadership in 1986. The significance comes from WTO, being an organization designed to promote trade among capitalist economies, requires a new member to harmonize its economic institutions to those in the modern private market economies. Until China completes doing so, it would continue to be classified a "non-market economy" and be ineligible for the full benefits of WTO membership. Seeking WTO membership was an arduous process for China, it took almost 15 years to complete. 9 This determined effort by China to gain membership in this conformitywith-capitalism organization revealed that the top political leaders who pushed for the "reform and opening" of China had already subscribed to the belief in the mid-1980s that only convergence to a private market economy would generate higher economic growth.
The Chinese government has been justifying the dramatic policy shift away from central planning and state-ownership with two claims. The first is that China is now in the primary stage of socialism, and "will remain so for a long time to come" (Wen, 2007) . The second claim is that within this present stage, the productive forces are better liberated and developed under a market economy that is predominantly private (i.e. a Chinese-style socialist market economy).
10 8 Until about 2000, the academic literature in the West debated about whether China's sustained high growth had come from indigenous institutional innovations that were non-capitalist in essence or from convergence to a modern capitalist economy. For reviews of this debate, see , Sachs, Woo and Yang (2000) , and Sachs and Woo (2003) . 9 The negotiations had started in March 1987 under GATT, the predecessor of WTO; see Long (2001) , and WTO (2001) . 10 These claims are consistent with a developmental perspective based on the following three hypotheses:
• there are different stages of economic development that are analytically distinct;
• certain conditions must be met before an economy could enter into the next stage;
It is appropriate for us on this occasion of the 30th anniversary of the policy regime shift Lardy (1998) wrote that: "China's major banks are even weaker than most official data suggest .. On a realistic accounting, these banks' capital adequacy is negative, and they are insolvent (pp. 95) ... The failure of China's largest financial institutions would disrupt the flow of credit and disrupt the payments system, leading to a collapse of economic activity. Woo's (2007) caution came from (1) the new major reforms being technically difficult to implement (e.g. setting up social safety nets), and having few, if any, successful precedents in the world to draw upon (e.g. designing market-compatible environmental regulation); and (2) the possibility that the many potential losers from these major reforms could successfully organise to resist meaningful implementation of the reforms. 19 Pei (2006b) "In a 'trapped transition', the ruling elites have little interest in real reforms. In March 2005, a low-key Princeton economist who had become a Federal Reserve governor coined a novel theory to explain the growing tendency of Americans to borrow from foreigners, particularly the Chinese, to finance their heavy spending.
The problem, he said, was not that Americans spend too much, but that foreigners save too much. The Chinese have piled up so much excess savings that they lend money to the United States at low rates, underwriting American consumption.
.... In the past decade, China has invested upward of $1 trillion, mostly earnings from manufacturing exports, into American government bonds and government-backed mortgage debt. That has lowered interest rates and helped fuel a historic consumption binge and housing bubble in the United States.
China, some economists say, lulled American consumers, and their leaders, into complacency about their spendthrift ways. At the last minute, however, Mr. Bernanke deleted a reference to the exchange rate being an "effective subsidy" for Chinese exports, out of fear that it could be used as a pretext for a trade lawsuit against China.
Critics detected a pattern. They noted that in its twice-yearly reports to Congress about trading partners, the Treasury Department had never branded China a currency manipulator.
"We're tiptoeing around, desperately trying not to irritate or offend the Chinese," said Thea M. Lee, public policy director of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. "But to get concrete results, you have to be confrontational."
More recently, Nicholas Lardy has graphically described China as being in a codependent relationship with the United States where:
"The United States is the addict. We are addicted to consumption. China is the dealer. They're supplying the credit that makes it possible for us to overconsume."
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The unsettling realization about this large supposedly deleterious flow of Chinese savings is that it shows no sign of stopping on its own. Table 1 (2008), we estimated "that the backward financial system in China made the 28 The single biggest boost to economic globalization in the 1990s was perhaps the post-1990 integration of the labor force in the former Soviet Union, India and China (SIC) into the international division of labor. The number of workers already engaged in the international division of labor in 1990 was 1,083 million, and the combined labor force of SIC was 1,232 million. The international division of labor in 1990 was certainly an unnatural one because half of the world's workforce had been kept out of it by the SIC's autarkic policies. By 2000, the number of workers involved in the international economic system in 2000 had increased to 2,672 million (with 1,363 million workers from SIC); data are from Freeman (2004) . 29 Feenstra and Hanson (1996) estimated the impact of these two developments on US wages. Immigration has also increased the anxiety of US worker; see Ottaviano and Peri (2005) . 30 These inadequacies are Gary Burtless (2005) who reported that within the G-7 in 2004, only the United Kingdom had a less generous unemployment benefits scheme than the United States. An unemployed person in the US received initial unemployment benefits that equaled 53 percent of previous income compared to 78 percent in Germany, 76 percent in Canada and France, 61 percent in Japan, 60 percent in Italy, and 46 percent in UK. The duration of unemployment benefits was 6 months in the US compared to 12 months in Germany, 9 months in Canada, 30 months in France, 10 months in Japan, and 6 months in Italy and the UK. 31 The savings rate rose because (1) the financial sector does not offer insurance against the increased risks that the public now faces (with the end f the iron rice bowl) in future employment, medical coverage, and pension benefits; and in these areas; (2) the financial sector does not offer adequate loans for housing and higher education, as these goods are no longer free (with the reduction in state subsidies); and (3) given the extreme difficulties in getting investment loans from the banks, entrepreneurial 
2.3: US-China Cooperation to Protect the WTO System
The optimum solution to reducing the friction in US-China trade relations is a policy package that emphasizes multilateral actions to achieve several important objectives. It is bad economics and bad politics to dwell on just one region (China alone), dwell on just one instrument (RMB appreciation alone), and dwell entirely on one target (external imbalance). In this time of deepening global recession, it is important that both China and US work together to forestall protectionism. China should focus on solving its trade surplus syndrome by undertaking import-intensive investments (e.g. sending students abroad on government scholarships) in the short-run, and promoting the growth of private financial institutions (that are diversified and adequately regulated) in the long-run. For its part, the US should reduce the pains of structural adjustment by strengthening social safety nets and programs that upgrade the skills of younger workers; and making healthcare insurance coverage independent of individual employers.
The most important action is for the United States and China start collaborating immediately to push the Doha Rounds to a successful conclusion. As China has so far played a passive role in pushing the Doha Round forward; by default, Brazil and India have assumed the leadership of the developing economies camp in the trade negotiations. According to Susan individuals saved more in order to realise their desires to set up small and medium enterprises. Liu and Woo (1994) Hotel Okura, Tokyo, Japan; which is why the terms "exchange rate coordination", "exchange rate stability", and "currency unification" are used interchangeably in the paper. (2000), and Blustein (2001) initiate) the regional panic by constantly issuing dire diagnoses of the patient. This is why many Koreans have dubbed the perfect storm they found themselves in "The IMF Crisis."
It is convenient to embrace Hypothesis 1 readily because no economy is without flaws.
However, the fact that output in Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand rebounded just as quickly as they had fallen falsifies the initial IMF belief that, beside monetary-fiscal tightening, drastic overhaul of the economic system and incentive structure similar to those undertaken earlier in the The second important relevant lesson from the Asian financial crisis is that "the only form of reliable help during an economic emergency is self-help." The IMF could not be counted upon to be always correct in its diagnosis upon its first reading of the situation.
Moreover, the United States could not be expected to be always ready to help out countries in desperate straits. In the three-decade long rule of General Soeharto, he had been bailed out several times before by the US and its allies (notably Australia, Japan, Holland, and the international financial institutions), and it was thus quite natural for him to expect some external aid when things started going awry in the last quarter of 1997. Soeharto was mistaken. He did not realise that with the end of the Cold War in 1992, he was dispensable to US security and ideological interests just as his fellow general, Joseph Mobuto of Congo-Leopoville, was dispensable; a newly-impoverished Indonesia was not as important to US policymakers as a newly-impoverished Mexico would because Indonesia was not an immediate geographical neighbor to the US and thence could not send a tsunami of unemployed workers into the US; and as he neared the end of his natural life-span, the Americans (after their costly experience with hanging on to the Shah of Iran until the bitter end in 1979) had become more interested in who would be replacing him than in maintaining him in power.
The only country that was willing to commit immediate large-scale financial assistance to the crashing Asian economies was the neighboring country of Japan, which proposed the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). Japan did not succeed in establishing the AMF, however. Three of the key reasons for the failure of the AMF initiative were that some important developed countries believed in the crony capitalism explanation of the crisis and concluded that an AMF would merely mean throwing more money to the undeserving, corrupt elite of these countries; some other developed countries wanted to protect the monopoly position of the IMF so that they could continue to command a disproportionate influence on world affairs; and China was not prepared to be rushed by events into supporting a new regional institution without careful consideration of all the implications.
These two lessons propelled the East Asian countries after their recovery to go on a reserves accumulation spree to insulate themselves from future speculative attacks (i.e. be independent of the supervision of the IMF). These lessons also led the Asian countries --the 10 ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea, collectively called ASEAN+3 --to start the process of currency and financial cooperation when they met in Chiangmai, Thailand, in 2000.
The resulting Chiangmai Initiative had two major components. We know enough from painful experiences, however, to be wary of linear thinking, otherwise, there would never be any turning points in history. We do well to remember the famous words of "History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce." Table 3 reports the projections of the inflation-adjusted GDP in 2025 and 2050 in the major countries in EU, NAFTA and AEU.
Part A of Table 3 While the United States would become increasingly large vis-a-vis Canada and decreasingly large vis-a-vis Mexico, the fact is that the US is the overwhelmingly dominant country in NAFTA at the present and will continue to be overwhelmingly dominant in the future.
In 2050, the US would be twelve times larger than Canada and almost five times larger than Mexico. Given this great disparity in economic size, it will always be true that independent economic shocks in Canada and Mexico would have very limited impact on the US economy, while a sneeze by the US could send powerful tremors to the other two NAFTA members. In such an unequal situation, the survival of individual currencies is natural because the giant US economy sees no advantage in allowing its monetary policy to be influenced by the concerns of 42 O'Neill, Wilson, Purushothaman and Stupnytska (2005) .
the smaller economies, and Canada and Mexico could use the exchange rate as an additional instrument to help offset shocks (especially trade shocks) originating from the US economy.
Part B of Table 3 reports the GDP of the three largest economies in the EU; Germany, United Kingdom, and France. Again using the smallest country in 2005 (France in this case) to normalise GDP, we see that the GDP ratio of Germany-UK-France would be: The GDP ratios reveal clearly that the biggest EU economies are of the same magnitude now and will continue to be so in the future. This means that independent shocks in each country will have sizable spillover effects on the others. This high level of economic interdependence amongst EU members means that the welfare of each member would be increased if national economic policies were coordinated in a manner that reduces negative spillover effects. One instrument for achieving this welfare-enhancing cooperative solution is a common currency.
Furthermore, on the political dimension, the natural compromise solution for a group of equally powerful countries would be a common currency rather than the adoption of any particular national currency. The fact that Europe is anxious to undertake political union in order to minimise the possibility of another war among Germany, UK, and France means that a common currency is a necessary by-product. (In 1950, when the French foreign minister Robert
Schuman pushed for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the forefather of EU, he explicitly admitted that this was a way to prevent further war between France and Germany. With the steel and coal industries under the control of a supranational organization, he would have made "war not only unthinkable but materially impossible." 43 )
Part C of Table 3 projects that the distribution GDP of the three major East Asian economies --Japan, China, and South Korea --display drastic changes over time. The GDP ratio of Japan-China-South Korea will be: However, because Chinese policymakers must be well aware of the changing balance in economic power within East Asia over the next three decades, it is hard to see why China today would want to support the establishment of a regional economic architecture that would establish a Yen-bloc. Similarly, even if China were to agree to the formation of a Yen-bloc right now, it is hard to see why it would not seek to change the fundamental nature of the regional financial architecture after 2035. It is, in short, politically unrealistic to expect a common currency for East Asia in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, it is also economically undesirable for East Asia to adopt a common currency because there has not been serious consideration of complete integration of national labor 43 Quote is from website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Coal_and_Steel_Community markets in the official and academic discussions on an Asian Economic Union. If economy A is entering into inflation while economy B is entering into recession, A will want to raise the interest rate while B will want to lower the interest rate. The uncomfortable reality is that whatever the compromise interest rate policy might be, it would be optimum only if labor from B could move freely and costlessly into A. 44 Without unhindered labor mobility across A and B as the adjustment mechanism to a common monetary policy, the benefits of a common currency could be greatly reduced, if not, overwhelmed.
Our opinion is that, one, the NAFTA-like disparity in economic power in AEU at the present and in the future, and, two, the absence of policy-induced integration of national labor markets mean that the only stable configuration is the survival of individual East Asian currencies with limited coordination among them in normal times. It therefore appears to us that the many present efforts to promote closer exchange rate cooperation will not succeed in the long-run. • how much to increase its resources to allow it to fight global financial fires,
• how wide to increase its jurisdiction to authorize it to improve regulation of financial markets, and
• how radically to restructure its ownership to give it the legitimacy to impose its will on prostrate economies.
However, while an improved IMF is highly desirable, the fact is that the better first line of Asian defense against financial contagion would be a greatly enhanced Asian swap facility, the Asian Financial Fund (AFF), because Asia collectively now has enough reserves to fend off unwarranted speculative attacks on a subset of its members. It must be emphasized that the core mission of the AFF is to combat financial contagion and not to finance balance of payments adjustment caused by economic mismanagement. This present emphasis by AFF on the former is what distinguishes it from the International Monetary Fund, which has both functions as its core mission.
An AFF is necessary because it is simply impossible (certainly, inefficient) to increase the size of the IMF enough to enable it to have in-depth expertise on most of the countries to be able to respond optimally in a timely manner to each national crisis. Furthermore, the IMF policies are decided by Executive Directors who usually take their orders from their national ministries of finance and central banks, and it would be credulous to think that a significant proportion of these national economic agencies would have up-to-date understanding of most of the emerging economies. Even if the improved technical competence of the IMF is not doomed to disappoint the emerging economies, the emerging economies would be disappointed by the long time required for an improved IMF to appear. The negotiations on meaningful IMF reforms would inevitably be cantankerous and hence protracted.
The Sarkozy-Brown proposal for a New Bretton Woods should be recognized to be part of the continuing effort by Old Europe to maintain its disproportionate representation in global governance bodies like the UN Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank. 45 The proposal to make the unreformed IMF the super financial policeman of the world is foolishness because the concentration of so much power in its hands would magnify the impact of any wrong operational procedure and allow the mistake to be unchecked for a longer time. If need be, the assignment of global financial regulation to an expanded BIS would be a better alternative. The IMF should forgo its dream of jurisdiction-expansion and become instead a more specialized agency that undertakes macroeconomic surveillance for the world, and balance of payments assistance for the emerging economies.
Right now, East Asia has a thin network of swap lines to defend their currencies. It would be desirable to hasten the evolution of the existing swap facility into the AFF by two actions. First, the existing swap facility specifies that a cumulative drawing that exceeds 20 percent of a country's quota would require the country to accept IMF supervision. This "flightto-IMF" clause should be removed because painful memories of 1997-98 make it politically suicidal for any East Asian leader to do so.
Second, the Asian swap facility must now establish a surveillance mechanism to prequalify its members for emergency loans. 46 Without a credible procedure to pre-qualify members, the removal of the "flight-to-IMF" clause would guarantee that the present system of (bilateral and multilateral) swap arrangements would not be sustainable and would not increase to meaningful sums. This is because the members want the pooled funds to be used only to 45 The veracity of this statement is strikingly seen in that the G-20 summit in November 2008 turned out to be a G-22 summit because some of the European members pressed successfully for the inclusion of the Netherlands and Spain in the summit. 46 Wang and Woo (2004) .
defend an exchange rate against speculative attacks not justified by fundamentals. The members would not support using the pooled reserves to defend an exchange rate that has been rendered overvalued by inflationary domestic policies. Without pre-qualification of potential borrowers, no member would be willing to risk committing a large part of its reserves to the swap facility. The first reason is that the 2008 global financial crisis has removed all doubt that financial panic and not crony capitalism was the cause of the Asian financial crisis, and that the IMF programs had made matters worse.
The second reason is that the US and Western Europe cannot really stop such a move anyway because, one, the East Asians now have the requisite amount of foreign exchange reserves to undertake self-insurance against speculative attacks on a subset of their members;
and, two, China has now changed its mind about the desirability of a regional financial institution.
The third reason is that there is now realization by the US that, when dealing with Asia, it should rely less on the hard power of a formal dominant role in global leadership, and more on the soft power of US example, like helping Asia do what's best for Asia (which is an excellent start to the US re-engagement with Asia). The US support for AFF is the much-needed change toward an inclusive US approach that is diversified in modality to handle each specific multilateral issue. Such a change in modality by the US would be a realistic response to the Asia-ward movement in the center of gravity of the world economy.
The fourth reason is that with the end of the Cold War, the international agenda of the US is no longer so similar to those of the Western European countries. This is why when Sarkozy pressed Bush in October 2008 to convene a G-7 summit to deal with the global financial crisis, Bush chose to convene a G-20 summit instead. The international economic agendas of the US and some the major developing countries now share many more common elements that are at odds with the position of the EU, e.g. agricultural subsidies.
The fifth reason is that the US and the rest of the interested world would be members of the AFF just as they are now influential members of the Asian Development Bank. The creation of the AFF would not mean the disappearance of their policy engagement with Asia.
Furthermore, just as we have the system of the World Bank and several regional development banks (like the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Development Bank), it is also natural and desirable to have regional financial institutions in addition to the IMF. The IMF is by no means obsolete with the establishment of the regional financial institutions. The IMF can play a very helpful role in speeding up the institutional maturity of these regional financial institutions, and in keeping up the competition of ideas.
The sixth reason is that the AFF could expand over time to be an APEC-level institution;
and be a good partner to the IMF because "two heads are better than one" in analyzing unexpected quickly-evolving crises and in preventing their contagion. In short, the better way to improve the supply of global public goods is not to simply increase the size of the existing providers but to increase the number of providers while seeking to improve the performance of existing ones.
Of course, over time, depending on the progress in reforming the operations and the governance of the IMF, and the new needs created by greater Asian economic integration, the Asian community might empower the AFF to also extend adjustment loans with conditionality to countries that needed balance of payments assistance because of past economic mismanagement.
It is important to note that pooling national foreign exchange reserve funds and using them to enhance regional welfare is independent of whether AFF would promote exchange rate coordination or not. One activity does not imply the other.
2.5: The Feasible Architecture for an Asian Economic Union
Earlier, we pointed out two features about East Asian economic integration. The first feature is that there are three separate ASEAN+1 FTA agreements but not an encompassing ASEAN+3 FTA agreement. The second feature is that the ASEAN+3 forum has effectively expanded to an ASEAN+6 forum since 2005. It is important to grasp that these two features reveal a key condition for the durability and effectiveness of any formal Asian economic integration, which is that the ASEAN+3 grouping is not a stable grouping. This is because some ASEAN+3 members were understandably concerned that China could quickly come to dominate the grouping through its sheer size. These members have therefore supported the admission of Australia, India and New Zealand into the regional grouping in order to create the possibility of forming a coalition to counterbalance China's weight in the economic union, if they feel the need to do so. In short, unlike ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 is a politically stable grouping because it allows check and balance within the organization.
The expansion of ASEAN+3 to ASEAN+6 is actually desirable economically as well as politically. Adam Smith has famously argued that the division of labor creates wealth, and that the degree of the division of labor is determined by the size of the market. As the biggest market that is available is the world market, the optimum size of an FTA is therefore the whole world! It is most probable that the bigger an FTA is, the bigger would be the gains from trade -which means that an ASEAN+6 grouping is economically superior to an ASEAN+3 grouping. The practical recommendation on regional trade and investment integration that emerges from our discussion is that an Asian Economic Union should go beyond being contiguously as large as possible to being as inclusive as possible, where geographical location is a secondary consideration.
On the financial side of the Asian Economic Union, our formulation of an Asian
Financial Fund (AFF) is operationally the establishment of a large Asian swap facility that has its own surveillance mechanism to pre-qualify members for emergency loans. The primary mission of AFF is to calm panic in the foreign exchange markets and not to defend currencies that have been rendered overvalued by domestic inflationary policies. AFF's goal is to attenuate the cost of bad luck and not the cost of bad policies.
Given the large size of East Asian foreign reserves, the AFF should take on the additional task of designing a pooling scheme where part of the East Asian reserves could be safely used to finance sound infrastructure projects in the poorest Asian countries. This outcome would be superior to the present practice of putting almost all of the East Asian foreign reserves into the assets of G-7 economies.
It is important that the AFF does not suffer from the institutional inertia that is characteristic of the present global organizations like the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The leadership structure of the AFF should be designed to avoid simply locking in the balance of economic power that existed at the time of its founding; much like the unchanging composition of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the head of the World Bank always being a US appointee and the head of the IMF always being a European. If AFF can adopt a self-updating type of leadership structure, its first contribution to the world (as well as to the East Asian region) would be the provision of an example to inspire positive developments in the reform of the leadership structure in the global organizations.
Final Remarks
The 30 (2004) paper on immiserizing-the-rich type of growth generated by the poor country. 47 We do believe that labor in the rich countries are under considerable stress because of the deep global structural adjustments brought by the integration of the labor force of China, India and the Soviet bloc into the world economy; and the acceleration of technological innovations (as exemplified by the revolution in information technology). It is also possible that these two trends might reinforce each other from the synergy created by the greater contact among people.
The new global equilibrium could be a win-win outcome for most of the population in every country but the process of moving to it is a painful one, particularly because of the general inadequacy of social safety nets and the ineffectiveness of labor re-training programs. However, protectionism and other forms of conflict to avoid the transitional pains is likely to end up in a lose-lose outcome for most of the population in every country.
China must therefore, in its own interests and the world's, help to reduce international tension by updating its strategy of international economic engagement. China has to go beyond being a passive beneficiary of the WTO system to being an active promoter of WTO objectives.
China can use its standing as a middle-income country to help bridge the breach in the Doha Rounds negotiations between the developed and developing economies; and to improve the rules on temporary protection in the face of massive structural dislocation. The strengthening of the WTO system would be one important way to prevent the world from into protectionism China must also play a stronger and more constructive role in the forthcoming international talks on global climate change. China and India are simply too big to be exempted for a long time from national ceilings on the emission of greenhouse gases. China should avoid its usual passive stance in international organizations. For example, China should be mobilising international consensus to form an international research consortium to develop ways to burn coal cleanly because China is now building a power station a week and is hence able to facilitate extensive experimentation on prototype plants to burn coal cleanly. If successful, this global cooperation on clean energy research will unleash sustainable development in China as well as in the rest of the world.
China should face down its internal political opposition to replace the backward statecontrolled financial system with a dynamic, but well-regulated, diversified private financial system in order to eliminate the odd phenomenon of a poor country lending to a rich country.
Savings behavior is not independent of the sophistication of the financial system. An advanced financial system will have a variety of financial instruments that would enable pooling of risks by providing medical insurance, pension insurance, and unemployment insurance; and transform savings into education loans, housing loans, and other types of investment loans to the private sector. Ceteris paribus, the more sophisticated a financial system, the lower the savings rate, the higher the investment rate, and hence the greater the probability of an optimum current account position.
For its neighborhood, China should push for an Asian Economic Union (AEU) that takes the form of a WTO-plus 48 free trade and open investment area that has regional pooling of foreign exchange reserves. And it cannot be over-emphasized that there is no economic logic for a regional financial facility to naturally morph into the regional central bank. Exchange rate coordination might occur sporadically but it is unlikely to be the norm in the medium term, and most possibly even in the long term. East Asia should therefore be focusing its energy on creating as wide a free trade area as possible (i.e. be geographically unrestricted), and forgo the 48 WTO+plus = the degree of openness exceeds existing WTO standards unrealistic goal of a common Asian currency. Given the great disparity in the present and future distribution of economic power in East Asia, and the greater restrictions on labor mobility within the (commonly proposed) Asian Economic Union, a NAFTA-type of Asian Economic Union would be preferable to an EU-type of Asian Economic Union. 
